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CONTEXT AS POWER: DEFINING THE FIELD OF
BATTLE FOR ADVANTAGE IN CONTRACTUAL
INTERACTIONS
Daniel D. Barnhizer*
INTRODUCTION
This Article explores the appropriate role for explicitly
extralegal contextual factors in regulating, creating, and enforcing
contracts. While contract law appears relatively neutral and
acontextual on its face, extralegal factors such as party status; the
circumstances of the bargain; performance by the parties; trade
usage and custom; and background political, economic, and social
contexts and circumstances may sometimes be more determinative
of the outcome of contract disputes than the explicit terms and legal
rules applicable to the parties' transaction.' It arguably follows that
courts should expansively use context to enforce the "real"
relationship between the parties.2
Potentially, expansive use of context may provide courts with a
more accurate sense of the parties' subjective agreement. But this
possibility is not without risks and limits. While contextual
approaches to contract hold real promise as a means of critiquing
and understanding contract law, there is little evidence that courts
can actually use context to achieve a more accurate picture of the
* Associate Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law.
The author thanks Lumen Mulligan, Nate Oman, Charles Ten Brink, Anne
Lawton, and David Barnhizer for their insights, comments, critiques, and
contributions to various drafts and presentations of this Article. The author
further thanks Salina Maxwell for her comments, edits, and tireless work as a
research assistant of the first caliber.
1. See, e.g., Alberto Salazar Valle, The Complex Context of Contract Law,
42 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 515, 516-17 (2004) (Can.) (reviewing IMPLICIT
DIMENSIONS OF CONTRACT: DISCRETE, RELATIONAL, AND NETWORK CONTRACTS
(David Campbell et al. eds., 2003) & LEONE NIGLIA, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
CONTRACT LAW IN EUROPE (2003), which suggest that contract law should
incorporate "implicit" contexts such as nonlegal sanctions, customs, trust,
cooperative practices, expectations, and conventions of meaning in language);
see also David Campbell & Hugh Collins, Discovering the Implicit Dimensions of
Contracts, in IMPLICIT DIMENSIONS OF CONTRACT: DISCRETE, RELATIONAL, AND
NETWORK CONTRACTS, supra, at 25, 25-28.
2. See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, The Real and the Paper Deal: Empirical
Pictures of Relationships, Complexity and the Urge for Transparent Simple
Rules, 66 M.L.R. 44, 45-46 (2003) (U.K.) (recognizing that context, in part,
illuminates the "real" deal between the parties).
3. See, e.g., id. at 45-47 (noting the gap between words used to express
agreement and the parties' actual understanding of their agreement).
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parties' real relation.4 This inability is due to subjective limits on
the quality and validity of the data used in judicial analysis as well
as inherent restrictions on judicial methods and capabilities. At the
extremes, an open-ended contextualism risks becoming a judicial
version of postmodern literary criticism or Monday-morning
quarterbacking in which widely varying subjective and subconscious
motivations are assigned to the helpless authors of the written
contract. Instead of a means for increasing the accuracy or quality
of judicial assessments of contract disputes, this Article argues that
deliberate attempts to expand the use of implicit contextual factors
are better understood as attempts to delegitimate existing contract
regimes and shift bargaining power to apparently disadvantaged
parties.
The use of high-context analysis to get at the "real" deal
between the parties, rather than restricting analysis to the
acontextual bargain evidenced by the "paper" terms and controlled
by abstract contract rules, is tremendously seductive." High-context
contract strategies promise nuanced understandings of the parties'
contractual relationship. Compared with the deficiencies of neo-
7.
and classically formalist contract doctrines in which ice-houses are
left standing undisturbed,8 sister Antillico wanders homeless,9 and
4. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court:
Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1765, 1804-06 (1996) (noting increased costs associated with high-context
approaches to commercial-contract disputes and observing that "although the
[Uniform Commercial] Code's adjudicative philosophy presupposes the
existence of an embedded set of unwritten customs that are truly known and
agreed to by transactors, there is some evidence that the existence of such
customs might be less pervasive than the Code assumes"); Robert E. Scott, The
Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 847, 863 (2000)
(observing that the state is incapable of supplying contextual factors and filling
gaps in contracts between heterogeneous parties).
5. For an excellent analysis of the potential false dichotomy lurking within
the real/paper distinction, see Catherine Mitchell, Contracts and Contract Law:
Challenging the Distinction Between the 'Real' and 'Paper' Deal, 29 O.J.L.S 675
(2009) (Eng.).
6. See Macaulay, supra note 2, at 49-56 (discussing the benefits of
achieving better understanding of parties' actual agreement and asserting that
actual agreement is more important than the benefits of certainty and
predictability supposedly gained from more formalist approaches to contract).
7. See Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Formation and the Entrenchment of
Power, 41 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 175, 195-218 (2009). Professor Hart argues
persuasively that modern contract law, even with critical safety valves such as
"unconscionability, economic duress, and misrepresentation," is still
fundamentally coercive with respect to unfair bargaining tactics by repeat
players who control nearly every aspect of the contract formation process. See
id. at 178, 216-18 ("[Lleaving formation completely intact and making it easier
to form a contract [under modern contract law] expands one party's capacity for
coercion.").
8. See Mitchill v. Lath, 160 N.E. 646, 647 (N.Y. 1928) (using the parol
evidence rule to bar evidence of a collateral parol agreement to demolish an
608 [Vol. 45
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Michigan drivers wonder why they bothered paying for uninsured
motorist coverage,10 high-context strategies promise to legitimate
contract law by enabling courts to enforce the "real" deal between
the parties and making contract law more reflective of actual social
understandings and interactions between the parties."
High-context approaches to contract are also seductive for
another reason. While specific components of expanded context
analysis are relevant to assessing the parties' relative bargaining
power, context-based arguments also concern power on a more
fundamental level. At their heart, arguments for expanded use of
context seek to change or expand the metaphorical field of battle for
power in the contract relation-to remove the advantages of the
(apparently) strong and balance out the disadvantages of the
(apparently) weak. 12
unsightly ice house).
9. See Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131, 131 (1845) (holding a promise to
provide home to widowed sister-in-law unenforceable for lack of consideration).
10. See Wilkie v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 664 N.W.2d 776, 787 (Mich. 2003)
(rejecting the reasonable expectations doctrine for Michigan insurance contracts
and reaffirming a textualist, plain-meaning approach to contract
interpretation).
11. For instance, in the examples above, relatively low-context rules on
parol evidence, consideration, and textualist contract interpretation contrast
with relatively high-context approaches that ameliorate apparently unjust
outcomes mandated by the low-context rules by making additional factors
legally salient. Thus, in a case like Wilkie, formalist textual interpretations and
objective theories of assent may be "softened" by making the insured's
reasonable expectations a legally salient factor in interpreting and enforcing
insurance contracts. Likewise, approaches to the parol evidence rule that reject
the capacity of written terms to define the parties' obligations completely and
unambiguously require the court to examine the entire context of the deal to
determine whether the written terms were in fact complete or unambiguous.
See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d
641, 645 (Cal. 1968) ("[T~he meaning of a writing '. .. can only be found by
interpretation in the light of all the circumstances that reveal the sense in
which the writer used the words."' (quoting Universal Sales Corp. v. Cal. Press
Mfg. Co., 128 P.2d 665, 679 (Cal. 1942)). And expanding the context of
promissory obligations to include reasonable detrimental reliance on a promise
likewise diminishes the situations in which seriously intended promises cause
injury to the promisee. See, e.g., Pop's Cones, Inc. v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc.,
704 A.2d 1321 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1998) (expanding promissory estoppel doctrine to
include situations in which promise enforcement is necessary to avoid injustice).
12. See, e.g., Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U.
COLO. L. REv. 139, 141-44 (2005) (arguing that courts should take a more
nuanced approach to assessing the parties' relationship in order to properly
balance bargaining power disparities); cf. ROBERT GREENE, THE 48 LAWS OF
POWER, at xviii (1998) ("Another strategy of the supposed nonplayer [seeking to
expand its power to influence surrounding events] is to demand equality in
every area of life. Everyone must be treated alike, whatever their status and
strength. But if, to avoid the taint of power, you attempt to treat everyone
equally and fairly, you will confront the problem that some people do certain
things better than others.... Again, many of those who behave this way are
actually deploying another power strategy, redistributing people's rewards in a
2010] 609
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This shift of bargaining power occurs both at the level of specific
classes of contracting parties and at the overall systemic level. At
the class-specific level, for instance, contextual claims that courts
should acknowledge that franchisees lack bargaining power in
contracting with franchisors in turn limit the ability of franchisors
to impose exploitative terms on their franchisees. "
At the systemic level, expanding the legally salient
considerations for assessing formation, interpretation, and
enforceability of contracts necessarily increases the scope of judicial
discretion and the variability of potential outcomes in contract
disputes." Expanded judicial discretion and variability of outcomes
in turn systemically shift bargaining power from repeat players that
benefit most from consistent application of the abstract rules of law
to other classes of contracting parties who can achieve advantage (or
minimize disadvantage) only by altering the rules of the game.15 In
this sense, the question of whether courts should adopt relatively
high-context strategies for contract dispute resolution is identical in
many cases to the question of whether courts should attempt to shift
bargaining power from repeat players such as business firms to
sporadic contractors such as consumers, employees, and franchisees.
These dual views of context-justice through detail and power
through changing the shape of the playing field-are potentially
either legitimative or delegitimative of the institutions in which
expanded context claims seek to operate. Although the legitimative
thesis promises a better quality of judicial contract dispute
resolution,16 it is not clear that high-context approaches improve
actual treatments of disputes. In contrast, the delegitimative thesis
does not concern the quality of judicial decision making, but rather
the contest over relative bargaining power between particular
classes of parties or systemically throughout contract law.17 While
there remains significant debate over the relative competence of
courts and legislatures to address issues of social policy,"' the
characterization of contextual claims as macrolevel bargaining
power contests suggests that these questions should be largely
way that they determine.").
13. See, e.g., Weaver v. Am. Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 1971)
(finding indemnification term in franchise agreement unconscionable in part
because of franchisee's lack of business sophistication and education).
14. See ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAw: AN ANALYSIS
AND CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF CONTRACT LAw 125-28 (1997)
(recognizing the judicial flexibility attendant to expanding the courts
consideration of contextual factors).
15. See infra Part IV.B.
16. See, e.g., Macaulay, supra note 2, at 45-46 (recognizing that analysis of
context captures the "real" deal between the parties).
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility in
Commercial Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 781, 782 (1999) (noting the inability of
courts to accurately identify or evaluate contextual factors).
610 [Vol. 45
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reserved for legislative action.
Part I of this Article briefly surveys what "context" could mean
in contract law. This Part includes arguments that courts should
expand their analyses of particular doctrines to respond to
particular, not currently salient contextual factors. Contextual
arguments also include, however, claims that abstract background
factors such as social, political, and economic influences on courts
and parties affect contracting outcomes. Both types of context
implicitly include a normative argument that courts should
recognize and respond to contextual factors in resolving contract
disputes.
Part II assesses the use of contextual factors in practice. In
particular, this Part introduces the problems that may arise from a
highly contextualized inquiry at the dispute resolution stage. Part
III assesses the proposition that contextualist analysis is valuable
for contract law because it in some sense legitimates contract law by
prompting courts to engage in a richer and more nuanced inquiry
into the context of disputes. Concluding that this legitimative thesis
is potentially incoherent, Part IV examines context as a
delegitimating influence on contract law that attempts to effect
systemic shifts in bargaining power between classes of contracting
parties. This Article concludes that it is questionable whether the
legitimative thesis justifies use of high-context contract dispute
resolution strategies, but that such strategies may be justified under
the delegitimative thesis.
I. CONTEXT IN CONTRACT
Contextual inquiries raise two separate but related problems of
scope and selection. In terms of scope, "context" in contract is
theoretically unlimited. Conceptually, some contexts are near in
scope to the agreement of the parties so that they more directly
impinge on the actual parties and transaction at issue, while others
are more removed such that the connection between those factors
and the actual agreement is tenuous. Thus, contextual scope may
be seen as a series of concentric rings around the actual agreement
including the terms of the agreement; the surrounding facts and
circumstances; the parties' understandings of applicable legal
requirements;1s trade usages and customs;20 party status or
19. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55, 60-62 (1963) (recognizing that parties
to an agreement focus primarily on the terms and circumstances of the
agreement and pay little attention to legal sanctions flowing from the
agreement).
20. See Richard Craswell, Do Trade Customs Exist?, in THE
JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 118, 118
(Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000) (noting the implicit assumption of
the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") that trade customs
2010] 611
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characteristics;21 the subject matter of the contract;22 background
cultural and linguistic understandings;n and background social,
political, and economic frameworks.24
Courts, whether adopting high-context or low-context contract
dispute resolution strategies ("HCS" and "LCS," respectively), must
limit the scope of contextual inquiry, even if only for judicial
economy. This scope may be constrained, as with classical and
neoformalist approaches that attempt to limit judicial discretion, to
relatively few legally salient factors, such as the mere existence of
consideration, and exclude a wider array of factors, such as the
value of the consideration or the parties' commercial backgrounds.
For instance, Professor Robert Scott would confine the proper scope
of contract law to relatively simple, acontextual factors suitable for
constrained, rules-based assessment and resolution. For Professor
exist, can be identified, and can be incorporated into analysis of commercial
disputes).
21. See Jane P. Mallor, Unconscionability in Contracts Between Merchants,
40 Sw. L.J. 1065, 1066 (1986) (noting the use of equity and unconscionability
doctrine to rescue from bad contracts "particular classes of people who were
deemed to be easily duped, such as widows, orphans, farmers, sailors on leave,
and the weakminded").
22. See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts and Worker
Mobility: The Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power Via Standard Form
Noncompetes, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 963, 964-67 (cubewrap employment
contracts); Hugh Beale & Tony Dugdale, Contracts Between Businessmen:
Planning and the Use of Contractual Remedies, 2 J.L.S. 45, 54 (1975) (U.K.)
(commercial contracts); Leah Guggenheimer, A Modest Proposal: The
Feminomics of Drafting Premarital Agreements, 17 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 147,
154-55 (1996) (premarital agreements); Richard Kaplan et al., Retirees at Risk:
The Precarious Promise of Post-Employment Health Benefits, 9 YALE J. HEALTH
POL'Y L. & ETHIcs 287, 295 (2009) (retiree health insurance contracts); Blake D.
Morant, Contractual Rules and Terms and the Maintenance of Bargains: The
Case of the Fledgling Writer, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 453, 461-63 (1996)
(publishing contracts); David F. Tavella, Are Insurance Policies Still Contracts?,
42 CREIGHTON L. REV. 157 (2008) (insurance contracts).
23. See, e.g., Thomas Scanlon, Promises and Practices, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
199, 199-203 (1990) (discussing the social institution of promising); see also
Marjorie Florestal, Is a Burrito a Sandwich? Exploring Race, Class, and
Culture in Contracts, 14 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (2008).
24. As Professor Leone Niglia argues:
[Tlwentieth-century contract law was never an autonomous legal
development, but the product of each polity's political order at any
given time. For, if one concentrates solely on the law, one cannot hope
to understand why the courts overwhelmingly applied rules that
protected consumers in one country but did not do so at all in another,
and today place more emphasis upon market factors than they do on
the rule book.
NIGLIA, supra note 1, at 6-7; see also Richard Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A
Study in the Industrialization of the Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 260-67 (1975)
(describing the holding in Hadley as driven by the economic conditions of 1850s
England).
25. See HILLMAN, supra note 14, at 126-28 (discussing the desire of
"neoformalists" to limit the discretion of the judiciary).
[Vol. 45612
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Scott, "Contract . .. is complex and subjective and synthetic in every
sense of those terms. The debate . .. is over the proper nature of
contract law. All contracts are relational, complex and subjective.
But contract law .. . is none of those things. Contract law is formal,
simple, and (returning to Macneil's terminology) classical."2 6
Alternatively, the scope may be relatively unconstrained, as
proposed by contextualists, who argue that contract law should be
more responsive to the "real" deal between the parties and account
for a wider array of factors such as trade usage and the
unconscionability of terms within commercial contexts.27 Professor
Stewart Macaulay has written extensively on the relationship
between the "real" and the "paper" deal.28 For Professor Macaulay,
contract law controls the abstract paper deal but has only a tenuous
connection to the social institution and practice of contract that
informs the parties' real bargain. 29 This real contract is informed by
a wide scope of contexts, including business culture, expectations of
good faith, and intrarelational understandings that develop between
parties.o
Selection of legally relevant contexts within each level of
contextual scope is far more complex. Undeniably, many contextual
factors, such as the gender and race of contract participants,
correlate with suboptimal outcomes." But the effect of such factors
is indeterminate in individual cases. Courts must make subjective
26. Scott, supra note 4, at 852.
27. See HILLMAN, supra note 14, at 125-60 (discussing contextualism);
Macaulay, supra note 2, at 45-47 (arguing that contract law should address the
"real" bargain between the parties).
28. See, e.g., Macaulay, supra note 19; Macaulay, supra note 2.
29. See Macaulay, supra note 19, at 60 ("[Mlany, if not most, exchanges
reflect no planning, or only a minimal amount of it, especially concerning legal
sanctions and the effect of defective performances."); Macaulay, supra note 2, at
61 ("'Contract law contributes to trust most of those who know the least about
it. My guess is that it operates as a vague threat that should be avoided in all
but a few situations.'" (quoting Stewart Macaulay, Crime and Custom in
Business Society, 22 J.L.S. 248, 254 (1995) (U.K.))).
30. See Macaulay, supra note 2, at 59-61; see also Beale & Dugdale, supra
note 22, at 54 (recognizing that parties contract based on a series of nonlegal
expectations and tend to avoid lawyers and legal remedies as inflexible and
unable to apprehend trade custom and commercial needs).
31. See, e.g., LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T ASK:
NEGOTIATION AND THE GENDER DIVIDE 1-8, 54-58 (2003); Ian Ayres & Peter
Siegelman, Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a New Car, 85
AM. EcoN. REV. 304, 309-10 (1995); cf. Blake D. Morant, The Relevance of Race
and Disparity in Discussions of Contract Law, 31 NEw ENG. L. REV. 889, 896-97
(1997) ("[Tlhose who teach, research, or practice contract law should broaden
their perspective to ensure that the dynamics of human perception and
disparity based upon race, gender, and class are explored in case analyses when
these issues play a role in the analysis of legal rules. When relevant, issues of
disparity should be considered and analyzed, not as exclusive determinants, but
as possible contributing components to the thought processes that lead to the
formation and breakdown of bargains.").
2010] 613
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selections of salient contextual criteria. But given the complex
relation between potentially relevant contextual factors and the
actual effect of such factors in individual cases, courts and later
observers and consumers of judicial output may not be capable of
identifying or evaluating them.32
High-context courts are thus relatively unconstrained in their
discretion to include and weigh particular contextual factors and
may even hide the true contextual basis for their decisions behind a
screen of other, plausibly relevant factors. 3 Such disparate and
unbounded selection of contextual factors eliminates potential
network benefits from development of standardized default contract
terms 4 and potentially threatens judicial legitimacy as users of the
legal system lose confidence in the quality of judicial product.
32. In this regard, Professor Omri Ben-Shahar identifies two separate
critiques: (1) courts cannot accurately identify or evaluate contextual factors;
and (2) those factors may not exist to be identified. Ben-Shahar, supra note 18,
at 782.
33. For instance, Dean Blake Morant's teaching on Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture provides an excellent analysis of the racial context of that
decision despite Judge Skelly Wright mentioning a host of other highly
contextualized factors. See Morant, supra note 31, at 925-36. Whatever may
be said about the ability of standards or rules to constrain the discretion of
decision makers, the greater the number of potentially relevant factors, the
easier it is for courts and other decision makers to obfuscate, justify, and
conceal the actual decision process.
34. See David Horton, Flipping the Script: Contra Proferentem and
Standard Form Contracts, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 431, 437-38 (2009) (offering a
sophisticated justification for acontextual application of contra proferentem
interpretive rules based on network benefits arising from standardization of
both the terms used and the legal meaning assigned to those terms); see also
Joshua Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Contract, 58 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1401 (2009) ("When one consumer creates an
idiosyncratic deal, the information-savings benefits of standardization are
reduced for all other potential customers.").
35. For example, users of relatively high-context regimes like the U.C.C.
and the Convention on the International Sale of Goods ("CISG") may decide to
opt out of those regimes. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 4, at 1815-20
(identifying reasons why parties to a grain and feed transaction would decide to
opt out of the U.C.C. and select a private adjudicative approach); Peter L.
Fitzgerald, The International Contracting Practices Survey Project: An
Empirical Study of the Value and Utility of the United Nations Convention on
the International Sale of Goods (CISG) and the UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts to Practitioners, Jurists, and Legal
Academics in the United States, 27 J.L. & CoM. 1, 14 (2008) (reporting that "55%
of U.S. practitioners who said they were familiar with the CISG specifically
choose to opt out of its coverage"). Although it is not clear that the parties
described by Professors Bernstein and Fitzgerald opted out specifically to reject
HCS, it is notable that the National Grain and Feed Association's ("NGFA")
private arbitration system is a formalist, relatively acontextual dispute
resolution mechanism. See Bernstein, supra note 4, at 1815-20. Similarly, if
parties actually valued HCS, one could hardly ask for a more contextualized
regime than the CISG. See, e.g., Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods arts. 8-9, Apr. 11, 1980, S. TREATY Doc. No. 98-9 (1983), 1489
[Vol. 45614
HeinOnline -- 45 Wake Forest L. Rev. 614 2010
CONTEXT AS POWER
Beyond these general observations and critiques, both the scope
problem and the selection problem can be understood as claims
about bargaining power. 6 The relationship between the selection of
legally salient contextual factors and bargaining power is obvious.
Producers, employers, franchisors, and other repeat players, for
example, suffer a loss of bargaining power if courts recognize a gross
disparity of bargaining power in favor of those classes and attempt
to correct that perceived disparity. And the adoption of HCS
systemically shifts bargaining power from those who benefit from
relatively low-context contract regimes to those who are currently
perceived as lacking such power.
Finally, "context" also implicitly includes a normative argument
that contract law should reflect the actual or real bargain between
the parties, of which the abstract explicit terms are only part. In
this sense, context arguably provides courts with a more accurate
picture of the real-world undertakings and understandings of the
parties, as opposed to the abstract and formalistic image provided by
reliance on the texts crafted by lawyers who were unconnected with
the deal.
Implicitly, these context-based arguments also suggest that
courts should account explicitly for extralegal contextual factors that
are currently legally irrelevant but nonetheless outcome-
determinative or outcome-influencing. Although we may
acknowledge intellectually that the limitations of human decision-
making capacities mean that more information may not yield
U.N.T.S. 3 (incorporating subjective intent and international trade custom and
usage into contract interpretation).
36. Cf. Kellye Y. Testy, Whose Deal Is It?: Teaching About Structural
Inequality by Teaching Contracts Transactionally, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 699, 700
(2003) ("Contracts . .. are bargains between particular persons or entities, not
free-floating bargains. Those identities matter in terms of the bargaining power
of the parties and the kind of contract that they need to embody their deal.").
37. See HILLMAN, supra note 14, at 125-27 (identifying this normative
position as "contextualist"); see also supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
38. Thus, as Dean Morant has argued, "[Tihe world is not perfect, and rules
of law may fail to operate effectively or efficiently when the rigidity of law does
not accommodate contextual nuances of specific situations." Morant, supra note
22, at 455 (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REv. 953,
957 (1995) ("Often rules will be too crude, since they run up against
intransigent beliefs about how particular cases should be resolved.")).
Similarly, Professor Kellye Testy argues:
There are many forces that push contract law toward
abstraction .... [Clontract law has an objective theory at its core that
tends to reduce its transactors to "reasonable" persons without races,
genders, or economic classes. There are no reasonable or
unreasonable people without these identity categories: all persons
have these identity markers and in this society those are significant
determinants of bargaining power. Thus, attention to issues of social
location makes the reasonable person a real one.
Testy, supra note 36, at 701.
2010] 615
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superior results, from an emotional or appetitive perspective more is
better. It is hard to argue against the promise of a "more accurate"
and "better" picture of the real deal. Calls for greater attention to
context are thus also implicitly calls for contract law to adjust
outcomes on the basis of that context.
II. CONTEXT IN PRACTICE: JUDICIAL USE (AND MISUSE) OF CONTEXT
AS BARGAINING POWER
Actual judicial treatment of contextual factors often seems to
assume that context matters and that it is the job of courts to
account for context and that courts can accurately assess and
respond to contextual factors. Consider, for example, the highly
contextualized treatment advocated by Judge Jerome Frank's
dissent in M. Whitmark & Sons v. Fischer Music Co. 39 In this case,
a lyricist sold a music publisher the renewal rights to his song
catalog (which were contingent on the artist's survival and would
not mature for twenty-two years) for $1,600.40 While the majority
held the assignment valid and enforced it as written,4 1 Judge Frank
dissented on purely contextual, extralegal grounds:
We need only take judicial notice of that which every schoolboy
knows-that, usually, with a few notable exceptions (such as
W. Shakespeare and G. B. Shaw), authors are hopelessly inept
in business transactions and that lyricists, like the defendant
Graff, often sell their songs "for a song." Here, then, is a case
where (a) the defendant was an author, one of a class of
persons notoriously inexperienced in business, and the
particular author was actually, at the time, in desperate
financial straits, while the plaintiff was a successful and
experienced publisher; (b) the property contracted for was of
such a character that, when the contract was made, "neither
party could know even approximately the value," so that "it
was a bargain made in the dark"; and (c) the consideration was
a very small sum.
Judge Frank's use of context demonstrates the pitfalls inherent
in high-context contract regimes. He begins with an unsupported
caricature of artists, a contextual scope well outside the surrounding
facts and circumstances of the actual parties and transaction at
issue. For Judge Frank, it is enough that Graff is a member of the
musician class to support a strong (if not irrebuttable) presumption
that Graff was incompetent at business matters. Even if Judge
Frank's stereotyping was generally true of the class of musician-
lyricists, such reasoning is dangerous both in terms of unintended
39. 125 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1942).
40. Id. at 954-55 (Frank, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 954 (majority opinion).
42. Id. at 955-56 (Frank, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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paternalistic effects" and in terms of the discriminatory impact
engendered in members of the protected class, their potential
contract partners, and in state attitudes. Although this problem
exemplifies the dangers of incorporating context in the form of
tainted stereotypes, it also shows another difficulty in determining
the scope and selection of appropriate contextual factors.
Specifically, Judge Frank's stereotype is not merely wrong and
grossly simplistic, it also blinds him to other potentially salient
contextual factors.
Consider the gaps in Judge Frank's context selection. The
plaintiff was in "desperate financial straits" at the time of the
contract. How desperate? Starving? Trying to buy a daveno for his
family? Judge Frank notes that M. Witmark & Sons was a
successful and experienced publisher but does not indicate that this
fact resulted in worse terms for Graff. It is in fact possible that a
successful music publisher might be willing and able to pay more for
the contingent rights at issue than an unsuccessful and
inexperienced firm. And while Judge Frank notes that the parties
were consciously ignorant of the value of the copyright assignment,
he draws a peculiar conclusion that their ignorance, together with
the price paid, made the bargain somehow unfair and unworthy of
enforcement."
Judge Frank's stereotype also illustrates that adding context
43. Professor Arthur Allen Leff cuttingly ridiculed this tendency of courts
to determine that they must protect classes of parties who lack what the court
deems sufficient contracting skill or sophistication. Arthur Allen Leff,
Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV.
485, 556-57 (1967) ("Put briefly, the typical has a tendency to become
stereotypical, with what may be unpleasant results even for the beneficiaries of
the judicial benevolence. One can see it enshrined in the old English equity
courts' jolly treatment of English seamen as members of a happy, fun-loving
race (with, one supposes, a fine sense of rhythm), but certainly not to be trusted
to take care of themselves. What effect, if any, this had upon the sailors is
hidden behind the judicial chuckles as they protected their loyal sailor boys, but
one cannot help wondering how many sailors managed to get credit at any
reasonable price. In other words, the benevolent have a tendency to colonize,
whether geographically or legally.").
44. M. Whitmark & Sons, 125 F.2d at 955-56 (Frank, J., dissenting). Of
course, any standards-based analysis can be critiqued in this way, and the
critique is in some senses unfair. Frank is writing in dissent, and it's not clear
how much of the extralegal contextual evidence is contained in his record.
Moreover, courts-particularly appellate courts-simply lack the resources to
consider the totality (or even an appreciable portion thereof) of the parties'
circumstances. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. And, even when
courts recognize those circumstances and consider that context, judicial
economy still requires judges to make gross categorizations of facts in order to
apply those facts to the abstract rules and standards of contract law. See, e.g.,
Barnhizer, supra note 12, at 236 (noting that courts may apply two-dimensional
approximation in assessing relative bargaining power of the parties because
"the costs of developing greater information regarding the parties' actual
balance of power would be too great").
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does not necessarily add meaning or resolve ambiguity. In
particular, Judge Frank uses context to obfuscate as much as
illuminate. The stereotype of the bumbling and unworldly musician
exploited by the sophisticated music publisher fits with our legal
mythology of the underdog and the oppressive business firm."
Judge Frank has, in essence, elevated his personal narrative of what
it means to be a member of the musician class to the level of a legal
myth invoking an archetypal struggle that rhetorically justifies
intervention to make sure the story comes out right. But this
stereotype prevents further inquiry into Judge Frank's declaration
that the consideration was a "small sum." I have no idea whether
$1600 in 1917 for a highly contingent copyright renewal right on a
song catalog of uncertain value that would not mature for many
years was in fact a small sum. And, presumably, neither did Judge
Frank.
All that judges can do in particular cases is assess post hoc
whether those outcomes fit within their own interpretations of often-
implicit background contexts and within their personal narratives
and legal mythologies. For Judge Frank, the sum was small most
likely because the musician lacked business savvy, not because
anyone actually assessed the value of the song catalog. 6 These
implicit background narratives are facts about the world, but they
cannot be associated with any meaningful right to recovery or
defense. They are context without content, nice things to know
about the characters in legal dramas, but, like the fact that Hamlet's
Ophelia was a nutter, not determinative of the outcome.
III. CONTEXT AS LEGITIMATION
While Judge Frank's M. Whitmark & Sons dissent illustrates
the very real and potentially damaging impact of improper use of
HCS, it is also true that HCS hold promise as a tool for assessing
contract obligations. Specifically, the promise of HCS rests in two
opposing normative theories justifying why courts should favor HCS
over LCS. First, HCS may be legitimative of contract law because
such strategies promise higher quality outcomes, measured in terms
of accuracy, justice, certainty, credibility, "feel-goodedness," or some
other metric (the "legitimative thesis").4 ' Alternatively, as discussed
in Part IV, HCS either demonstrate the internal incoherence of
45. See Barnhizer, supra note 12, at 238-40 (discussing the myth of
unequal bargaining power).
46. Professor Valle notes this problem in critiquing Leone Niglia's
macrocontextual analysis of the importance of background factors in contract
law. Valle, supra note 1, at 524 ("[Niglia] argues that moving forward requires
the abandonment of abstracted views of the law. However, beyond this, no clear
solutions are offered.").
47. See, e.g., Macaulay, supra note 2, at 45-46 (arguing that analysis of
context captures the parties' "real" deal).
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contract law or undermine the legal infrastructure of contract
(presumably to replace it with a different infrastructure). Such
delegitimating arguments normatively require courts to adopt HCS
or admit the internal incoherence and illegitimacy of contract law
(the "delegitimative thesis").
To evaluate these theses, this Article uses examples from
unconscionability challenges to arbitration agreements in Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals49 opinions issued between 2000 and 2010.
This is not an attempt at empiricism but rather is merely a useful
body of anecdotal cases from a court that has engaged the
arbitration unconscionability issue repeatedly and vigorously.50 The
specific legal issue of unconscionability works well for this Article's
purpose because it requires a relatively high-context inquiry51 while
48. See infra Part IV. Professor Duncan Kennedy's analysis of specific
contextual factors thought to beget inequalities of bargaining power, for
instance, identifies claims of bargaining power disparities as incoherent but
nonetheless useful as a weapon of Left and Center-Left attacks on the
legitimacy of contract. See Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist
Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms
and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 620-24 (1982)
(acknowledging the incoherence of the concept of inequality of bargaining power
but advocating the use of the doctrine as a destabilizing influence against
classically liberal and formalist notions of contract).
49. The Ninth Circuit is arguably relatively hostile to arbitration clauses,
particularly to clauses arising from the employment or consumer contexts, as
compared to other federal appellate courts. See Stephen K. Huber, Arbitration
and Contracts: What Are the Law Schools Teaching?, 2 J. AM. ARB. 209, 290
(2003) (noting the "Ninth Circuit's lonely position of hostility to arbitration
among federal appellate courts"); Michael G. McGuinness & Adam J. Karr,
California's "Unique" Approach to Arbitration: Why This Road Less Traveled
Will Make All the Difference on the Issue of Preemption Under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 2005 J. Disp. RESOL. 61, 61 ("Recent decisions in California
state courts and the Ninth Circuit. .. show that the same judicial hostility
ostensibly thwarted eighty years ago continues today, albeit in a more subtle-
but equally hostile-form."); Ramona L. Lampley, Is Arbitration Under Attack?:
Exploring the Recent Judicial Skepticism of the Class Arbitration Waiver and
Innovative Solutions to the Unsettled Legal Landscape, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 477, 503 n.128 (2009) (noting Ninth Circuit hostility to class-action
waivers in arbitration clauses).
50. An empirical analysis comparing the degree of contextual analysis in
assessments of consumer and employment arbitration agreements versus
assessments of agreements between commercial entities is beyond the scope of
this brief Article. Notably, in a true empirical examination of related questions,
University of Chicago Bigelow Fellow Anthony Niblett has engaged in a highly
sophisticated analysis of judicial inconsistencies in reasoning, choice of facts,
and application of law in unconscionability decisions by California appellate
courts that is the subject of a forthcoming article. See Anthony Niblett,
Tracking Inconsistent Judicial Behavior (July 31, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1434685.
51. See U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2003) ("The basic test is whether, in the light
of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of the
particular trade or case, the term or contract involved is so one-sided as to be
unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of
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remaining manageably narrow because such cases are generally
limited to challenges to the arbitration clause itself.5"
Between January 2000 and January 2010, the Ninth Circuit
reviewed and addressed unconscionability challenges to arbitration
clauses in thirty-eight cases in which the party resisting the
arbitration clause explicitly raised an unconscionability challenge to
the enforceability of the clause." The contracts in these cases
primarily involved employment (nineteen cases),' with the other
contracts involving telecommunications (nine cases)," credit cards
the contract." (emphasis added)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208
cmt. a (1981) ("The determination that a contract or term is or is not
unconscionable is made in the light of its setting, purpose and effect." (emphasis
added)).
52. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-
04 (1967).
53. These cases were generated by two separate searches within Westlaw's
9th Circuit cases database (CTA9) with a date restriction between January 1,
2000 and January 1, 2010: (1) "arbitration & unconscionability"; and (2) a
search for West Key number "25Tk134" (covering Alternative Dispute
Resolution-Arbitration-Agreements to Arbitrate-Requisites and Validity-
Validity) plus the additional search term "unconscionability." Two additional
and related cases involved claims of unconscionability in party briefs or
assessments of unconscionability by the dissent that were not addressed by the
majority opinion. See Aceves v. Autonation, Inc., 317 Fed. App'x 665, 666-67,
667 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that a contract clearly and unmistakably
reserved for an arbitrator the question of arbitrability and ignoring the
dissenting argument that a class-action waiver rendered the arbitration clause
substantively unconscionable); Ariza v. Autonation, Inc., 317 Fed. App'x 662,
663-64, 665 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009) (same).
54. Jackson v. Rent-A-Ctr. W., Inc., 581 F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 2009); Gray v.
Rent-A-Ctr. W., Inc., 314 Fed. App'x 15 (9th Cir. 2008), vacated as moot, 295
Fed. App'x 155 (9th Cir. 2008); Rogers v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, 547 F.3d
1148 (9th Cir. 2008); Davis v. O'Melveny & Myers, 485 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir.
2007); Martin v. TeleTech Holdings, Inc., 213 Fed. App'x 581 (9th Cir. 2006); Al-
Safin v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 394 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2005); Batory v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 124 Fed. App'x 530 (9th Cir. 2005); Ramsdell v. Lenscrafters,
Inc., 135 Fed. App'x 130 (9th Cir. 2005); Semcken v. Genesis Med.
Interventional, Inc., 132 Fed. App'x 155 (9th Cir. 2005); Siordia v. Circuit City
Stores, Inc., No. 03-56459, 2005 WL 1368083 (9th Cir. June 9, 2005); Circuit
City Stores, Inc. v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2003); Domingo v.
Ameriquest Mortgage. Co., 70 Fed. App'x 919 (9th Cir. 2003); Ingle v. Circuit
City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2003); Melton v. Philip Morris, Inc., 71
Fed. App'x 701 (9th Cir. 2003); Scott v. Borg Warner Protective Servs., 55 Fed.
App'x 414 (9th Cir. 2003); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889 (9th
Cir. 2002); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2002);
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2002); Ferguson v.
Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2002).
55. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009); In re
Detwiler, 305 Fed. App'x 353 (9th Cir. 2008); Janda v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 267
Fed. App'x 727 (9th Cir. 2008); Lowden v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 512 F.3d 1213
(9th Cir. 2008); Douglas v. U.S. Dist. Court, 495 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2007); Ford
v. Verisign, Inc., 252 Fed. App'x 781 (9th Cir. 2007); Laster v. T-Mobile USA,
Inc., 252 Fed. App'x 777 (9th Cir. 2007); Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless
Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2007); Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir.
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or other lending (three cases),56 franchising (two cases), business
services (two cases)," sale of goods (two cases),59 and joint venture
investments (one case).o The court either enforced the arbitration
clause or remanded the case for further findings as to substantive or
procedural unconscionability in nine of the thirty-eight cases.6' As
discussed below, these cases provide anecdotal support for the
proposition that the legitimative thesis is incoherent.
The legitimative thesis is attractive because it claims that HCS
are desirable because they do contract "better." For example, in a
line of cases involving Circuit City's attempt to impose binding
arbitration in employment disputes, the Ninth Circuit shows the
progressive inclusion of additional context, which, at first blush,
appears to improve the quality and accuracy of the judicial
outcomes. In 2002, the court affirmed the enforceability of an
arbitration clause in two cases, holding that the agreement was not
procedurally unconscionable because it permitted employees to opt
out and retain their right to litigate.6 ' Notably, Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Ahmed is relatively acontextual in that the opt-out term by
itself was sufficient to justify a finding of no procedural
unconscionability." In contrast, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Najd
2003).
56. Davis v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 299 Fed. App'x 662 (9th Cir. 2008);
Hoffman v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 546 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2008); Tamayo v.
Brainstorm USA, 154 Fed. App'x 564 (9th Cir. 2005).
57. Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257 (9th Cir. 2006); Ticknor v.
Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2001).
58. Kam-Ko Bio-Pharm Trading Co. v. Mayne Pharma (USA) Inc., 560 F.3d
935 (9th Cir. 2009); Net Global Mktg., Inc. v. Dialtone, Inc., 217 Fed. App'x 598
(9th Cir. 2007).
59. Chalk v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 560 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2009); Oestreicher
v. Alienware Corp., 322 Fed. App'x 489 (9th Cir. 2009).
60. Dziubla v. Cargill, Inc., 214 Fed. App'x 658 (9th Cir. 2006).
61. See Kam-Ko Bio-Pharm Trading Co., 560 F.3d at 942; In re Detwiler,
305 Fed. App'x 353, 356 (9th Cir. 2008); Hoffman, 546 F.3d at 1084-85; Rogers
v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, 547 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2008); Dziubla,
214 Fed. App'x at 659-60; Semcken v. Genesis Med. Interventional, Inc., 132
Fed. App'x 155, 156 (9th Cir. 2005); Melton v. Philip Morris, Inc., 71 Fed. App'x
701, 704 (9th Cir. 2003); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198,
1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2002); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1104, 1108
(9th Cir. 2002).
62. Al-Safin v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 394 F.3d 1254, 1256 (9th Cir. 2005);
Siordia v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., No. 03-56459, 2005 WL 1368083, at *1 (9th
Cir. June 9, 2005); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101, 1104 (9th
Cir. 2003); Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1169 (9th Cir. 2003);
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 891 (9th Cir. 2002); Ahmed,
283 F.3d at 1199; Najd, 294 F.3d at 1106.
63. Ahmed, 283 F.3d at 1200; Najd, 294 F.3d at 1108.
64. Ahmed, 283 F.3d at 1199-1200 ("[Tlhis case lacks the necessary
element of procedural unconscionability. Ahmed was not presented with a
contract of adhesion because he was given the opportunity to opt-out of the
Circuit City arbitration program by mailing in a simple one-page form.").
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uses a higher context approach, including analysis of the parties'
relationship, the meaning of an employee's silence, the clarity of the
terms and descriptions of the consequences of failing to opt out, the
opportunity to review the agreement with an attorney, Circuit City's
statement to its employees that opting out would not affect the
employment relationship, and the thirty-day review period provided
to employees, to justify its finding that the agreement was not
procedurally unconscionable. 5
In contrast, one year later in Circuit City Stores v. Mantor the
court held the same agreement 66 procedurally unconscionable
because the opt-out provision was not meaningful.6 7 There, the
court found that despite the abstract opt-out terms, "Circuit City
management stressed that employees had little choice in this
matter; they suggested that employees ought to sign the agreement
or prepare to be terminated."6  Assuming that Najd and Ahmed
would have been subjected to the same unwritten corporate policy,
the greater context of the Mantor decision appears on its face to
deliver a better and more accurate depiction of the parties' real
bargain of which the abstract contract terms were only a small (and
misleading) part.
But on further examination, the court's greater attention to
context does not appear to deliver the promised benefits of greater
accuracy and credibility. The distinctions between Najd, Ahmed,
and Mantor depended only on the lowest level of contextual
analysis-surrounding facts and circumstances that respond
directly to elements of the legal rule or standard at issue.
Procedural unconscionability in most jurisdictions depends in part
on the availability of meaningful alternatives." Whether Circuit
City rendered a paper right to opt out illusory is clearly relevant to
whether employees had meaningful alternatives to accepting the
65. Najd, 294 F.3d at 1109.
66. Circuit City did regularly amend provisions in its Dispute Resolution
Agreement ("DRA") and Dispute Resolution Rules and Procedures ("DRRP")
contracts. See, e.g., Siordia, 2005 WL 1368083, at *1 (reviewing cases holding
Circuit City's 1995, 1998, and 2001 DRAs and DRRPs unconscionable and also
determining that Circuit City's 1997 and 2000 DRAs and DRRPs were likewise
unconscionable). Despite other revisions, the opt-out term was present in the
Ahmed, Najd, and Mantor contracts. Mantor, 335 F.3d at 1104; Ahmed, 283
F.3d at 1199; Najd, 294 F.3d at 1106.
67. Mantor, 335 F.3d at 1106.
68. Id. at 1104.
69. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449
(Fed. Cir. 1965) ("Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an
absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with
contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party."); Arnold v.
United Cos. Lending Corp., 511 S.E.2d 854, 861-62 (W. Va. 1998) (discussing
lack of meaningful alternatives in assessing procedural unconscionability);
Coady v. Cross Country Bank, 729 N.W.2d 732, 741 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007) (noting
lack of meaningful alternatives as an element of procedural unconscionability).
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arbitration agreement. Moreover, these surrounding facts and
circumstances concerned events that actually happened between the
actual parties to the actual disputes. In short, this level of context is
already legally salient to judicial resolution of the dispute.
But at a higher level of contextual analysis, Ninth Circuit
unconscionability opinions adopt a contextual approach that is
indistinguishable from Judge Frank's absurd speculations about the
business savvy of musicians. In these cases, consumers,'0
employees, 7 and franchisees 72 replace musicians in the stereotyped
analysis of relative bargaining power and oppression by established
business firms. Once the court identifies the party resisting
arbitration as a member of a protected status, further inquiry into
context ceases. "Context" becomes the new formalism.
Ninth Circuit panels, for instance, ubiquitously hold that
potential employees have no bargaining power in applying for or
continuing in employment, even when the employer can
demonstrate the existence of alternative employment contract terms
with different employers. As the court held in Ferguson v.
Countrywide Credit Industries:
[Whether the [employee] had an opportunity to decline the
defendant's contract and instead to enter into a contract with
another party that does not include the offending terms is not
the relevant test for procedural unconscionability. Instead,
California courts have consistently held that where a party in
a position of unequal bargaining power is presented with an
offending clause without the opportunity for meaningful
negotiation, oppression and, therefore procedural
unconscionability, are present.74
Likewise, in Davis v. O'Melveny & Myers, the court held that a
current employee who was given ninety-days notice of a contract
amendment that required arbitration, plus an opportunity to review
the terms and meaning of the arbitration program with an attorney,
had no bargaining power and lacked any meaningful alternatives.*
The court repeatedly uses this same technique of adopting a
single contextual factor-the status of the plaintiff as an employee, a
consumer, a franchisee, etc.-to bar consideration of other
contextual factors that might ameliorate the unconscionability
analysis. Even when the court engaged in arguably its most wide-
70. See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003).
71. See, e.g., Al-Safin v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 394 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir.
2005).
72. See, e.g., Ticknor v. Choice Hotels, Int'l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931 (9th Cir.
2001).
73. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778,
784 (9th Cir. 2002).
74. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
75. Davis v. O'Melveny & Myers, 485 F.3d 1066, 1073-75 (9th Cir. 2007).
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ranging contextual analysis-Ting v. AT&T-it did so for the
purpose of slamming AT&T's pathological conduct and then only
after it had already suggested that additional contextual evidence
was irrelevant under California law.7 6  In other cases, such as
Ticknor v. Choice Hotels,n the court clearly used contextual
assumptions regarding the bargaining power of franchisees and
consumers as a bar to further high-level contextual analysis. In
Ticknor, Ticknor purchased a franchise from Choice Hotels to
operate an Econo Lodge hotel in Montana.7 " The contract included a
relatively vanilla arbitration clause, requiring arbitration of all
disputes except indemnification, collection of moneys owed, and
trademark claims.7 ' The majority opinion concluded that "the
Franchise Agreement was a standardized, form agreement that
Ticknor was forced to accept or reject without negotiation."o The
court buttressed this conclusion by equating the franchisee's alleged
lack of meaningful alternatives with that of consumers.
The dissent focused on the multitude of contextual factors that
the majority opinion excluded. For instance, when the majority held
the contract adhesive because Ticknor was forced to accept it
without negotiation, the dissent observed that the district court
specifically found that "negotiations took place between James
Ticknor and a Choice representative in Montana."8 2 Likewise, the
majority's castrated bargaining power analysis ignored the fact that
Ticknor was not unsophisticated regarding hotel operations and
franchises:
Plaintiffs are not unsophisticated "consumers" under any
definition of the term and this is not a consumer transaction.
Ticknor Lodging Corp.... owns and operates at least two hotel
properties-the one at issue and another in Colorado.
Plaintiffs have been operating these properties under
franchise agreements with two [other] separate
franchisors .... Additionally, unlike the plaintiffs in the cases
cited above, the Ticknors have not demonstrated that they had
no other viable alternatives, i.e., that they "face[d] the
possibility of being excluded from the [hotel franchise] market
unless [they] accept[ed] a contract with such an agreement to
arbitrate." Rather, the record suggests that plaintiffs made a
conscious decision to change their affiliation because they
76. Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1149 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[Elven assuming
[contract] alternatives matter under California law . .. it nonetheless fails to
overcome the district court's well-founded conclusion that the CSA is a
procedurally unconscionable contract.").
77. 265 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2001).
78. Id. at 935.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 939.
81. Id. at 941.
82. Id. at 943 n.4 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
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believed that the Econo Lodge mark and system would increase
their profitability. They willingly accepted the negotiated
burdens of the new franchise agreement in return for the
expected benefits of the Econo Lodge mark. In other words,
plaintiffs had not only a theoretical, but also an actual choice.
No adhesion contract was crammed down their throat.
Similarly, in Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., the court again used
a high-context determination that Nagrampa was part of a class of
franchisees indistinguishable from consumers to bar consideration
of other contextual factors that indicated she had meaningful
alternatives to the MailCoups franchise contract and was
sufficiently sophisticated to understand that contract.8 4 While the
MailCoups franchise agreement was nonnegotiable, MailCoups
argued that Nagrampa was not unsophisticated because she had
substantial expertise working as a sales manager in the direct mail
industry, had a choice to continue working for her then employer,
and could have (and declared she had) read and understood the
franchise agreement before signing. Importantly, the court simply
rejected MailCoups' evidence of Nagrampa's bargaining power
because it had already determined she was a member of a class of
contracting parties that had no bargaining power. Instead of real
analysis, the court merely cited broad references to "prevailing,
although not universal, inequality of economic resources between
the contracting parties" and "typical[]" characteristics of franchisees
and franchisors, and noted "[firanchising involves the unequal
bargaining power of franchisors and franchisees and therefore
carries within itself the seeds of abuse."86
Ninth Circuit courts' regular use of high-context factors such as
the plaintiffs' employee, consumer, and franchisee status to bar
consideration of other contextual factors tending to favor the
allegedly stronger party is just wrong. Bargaining power is never a
simple issue and can change instantly and radically upon an infinite
array of inputs. For instance, as Professor Richard Epstein has
observed, in many cases employees have superior bargaining power
to employers, particularly in the application phase.8" Applicant
83. Id. at 942-43 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
84. Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1282-83 (9th Cir. 2006).
85. Id. at 1281-83.
86. Id. at 1282 (quoting Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Sealy, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d.
365, 373-74 (Ct. App. 1996)).
87. See Barnhizer, supra note 12, at 160-92 (explaining the characteristics
of power).
88. See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L.
REV. 947, 966-70 (1984) (assessing extralegal restraints on the power of
employers to abuse at-will employment relationships); see also Richard A.
Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & EcON. 293, 314-15
(1975) (assessing extralegal restraints on the power of franchisors to abuse
termination-at-will terms in franchise agreements).
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employees who have existing jobs or options, for instance, may have
superior information regarding employer reputation and available
alternative employment opportunities, and a superior ability to
bargain for increased wages.89 Moreover, the economic conditions at
the time of contracting-specifically the availability of alternative
employment-should be a highly relevant contextual background
factor.9o Likewise, a firm's reputation for treatment of employees
should be considered a significant contextual factor in the
applicant's decision making. Employees who knowingly or
recklessly choose to go forward in a highly negative context should
not be able to claim that they were unfairly surprised or oppressed
into accepting problematic employment contracts.9'
The remarkable thing about these cases is not that they
generally engage in entirely superficial contextual bargaining power
analyses. That is typical of judicial attempts to pretend courts are
competent to identify (and, implicitly, correct) bargaining power
disparities between contracting parties.92  Leaving aside the
89. See Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, supra note 88, at 975-
76.
90. This is not to suggest that it is realistic to require that employees quit
their jobs because of a change in employment contracts requiring employees or
prospective employees to submit to arbitration, although in some cases that is
undoubtedly the case. Rather, the ability of employees, consumers, or other
classes of parties perceived generally to have little bargaining power to affect
the quality of the bargains they receive depends not just on whether they read
and understood those bargains, but also on their perceptions of the other party's
reputation in dealing with similarly situated parties. Thus, to determine
whether Mrs. Williams actually had no bargaining power in deciding to
purchase the daveno from Walker-Thomas Furniture, the allegedly confusing
terms of the cross-collateralization clause in her contract are only part of the
analysis. Even if Mrs. Williams did not read or understand the abstract terms
on paper, it is very likely that she had real knowledge about what happened to
people who defaulted on their payments to Walker-Thomas. See Eben Colby,
Note, What Did the Doctrine of Unconscionability Do to the Walker-Thomas
Furniture Company?, 34 CONN. L. REV. 625, 652 (2002). While such reputational
context might not exist at the time of the first use of an abusive contract (and
may never exist if the contract is not enforced abusively), it will definitely come
into existence after the company begins attempting to enforce the allegedly
unconscionable terms against employees, consumers, franchisees, and other
allegedly weak parties.
91. An Internet Ask.com search for "How does Circuit City treat its
employees?," for instance, yields numerous stories by disgruntled employees,
including employees who believe they were harmed by Circuit City's arbitration
process. See http://www.ask.com/ (search "How does Circuit City treat its
employees?") (last visited July 12, 2010).
92. See Barnhizer, supra note 12, at 199-201 (discussing the failure of
courts to adopt a coherent approach for addressing disparities in bargaining
power); Daniel D. Barnhizer, Propertization Metaphors for Bargaining Power
and Control of the Self in the Information Age, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 69, 105
(2006) ("The contract model for assessing bargaining power looks primarily to
limitations on a party's bargaining power. Did the parties lack meaningful
alternatives? Was one of the parties operating under necessity? Did the parties
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question of whether there is any legitimate normative justification
for such judicial interference, these cases demonstrate that the
legitimative thesis is likely incoherent.
In this respect, HCS are qualitatively identical to attempts to
assess the bargaining power relation between two parties to a
particular contract dispute. The legitimative thesis proposes that
HCS are better because they give a more accurate picture of the deal
the parties "really" intended but may have only imperfectly captured
in the abstract terms of their contract.93  Context theoretically
permits courts to interpret the abstract agreement in light of the
wider scope of surrounding facts and circumstances, potentially
including background social, political, economic, and even
philosophical factors.
But the Ninth Circuit arbitration clause unconscionability cases
discussed above suggest that when courts actually adopt HCS, they
do not seek accuracy or greater fidelity to the "real" contract.
Instead, many of these courts seemed to use a small number of high-
context factors as a rule or "supercontext" for barring the
assessment of other high-context factors that might interfere with or
complicate application of a particular rule or standard. Rather than
increased nuance or accuracy, or even "feel-goodedness," HCS were
used to forestall more nuanced inquiries in favor of a judicial
caricature of the relation between the parties.
HCS at the judicial level thus likely would fail to deliver
meaningful or measurably superior outcomes compared to LCS."
fit within traditionally weak or strong status classifications such as poverty,
gender, age, education, business sophistication and so on? Once the court
satisfies that determination-one way or the other-the inquiry stops."
(footnotes omitted)).
93. See Macaulay, supra note 2, at 79.
94. Other high-context regimes have arguably failed to produce
meaningfully better outcomes compared to LCS. For instance, the U.C.C. is an
explicitly high-context regime intended to incorporate actual business norms
and commercial practices as default rules for resolving commercial disputes.
But, as Professor Robert Scott observes, judicial decisions have failed to
incorporate more definite immanent business norms into the U.C.C.:
While the Code was explicitly designed to incorporate evolving norms
into an ever-growing set of legally defined default rules, incorporation
as such has simply not occurred. To be sure, courts have interpreted
contracts in which context evidence has been evaluated together with
the written terms of the contract. .. . But while such judicial
decisions affirm the institutional bias toward contextualizing the
contract, the fact-specific nature of the contract dispute leaves, in
virtually every case, little opportunity for subsequent incorporation as
tailored defaults.
Robert E. Scott, The Uniformity Norm in Commercial Law: A Comparative
Analysis of Common Law and Code Methodologies, in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 20, at 149, 165-
66. Other commentators have likewise recognized that HCS undermine the
ability of tribunals to produce repeatable and credible results. For instance,
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Alternatively, even if there are some observable benefits to HCS,
such strategies are so costly that any benefits are outweighed by the
additional time, expense, and uncertainty that courts and parties
must incur. Disregarding whether the court reached the "right"
answer in the abstract, there is still no sense in which users of the
legal system are left with any feeling that the court got it "more"
right because of the contextual analysis.
Further, the incoherence of the legitimative thesis can only
increase as the background cultural, economic, and political
structures become increasingly heterogeneous. More importantly,
HCS necessarily increase the likelihood that users of the legal
system will perceive it as chaotic, unprincipled, or biased in favor of
particular interest groups. Globalization, multiculturalism, and
developments of new hybrid cultures expand the scope of obvious
contextual factors that could potentially determine or influence
contract outcomes.95 That variability in turn affects the credibility
of the decisions in high-context contracts doctrines like
unconscionability.
The legitimative thesis in support of HCS is thus neutral at best
and likely incoherent in many cases. It sacrifices the appearance
(and perhaps also the fact) of predictability and certainty in contract
law and, at the extremes, substitutes the appearance (and perhaps
also the fact) of confusion, bias, and ad hoc decision making. But, as
discussed below, HCS still serve an important critical role in
contract law that may affect bargaining power disparities between
classes of contracting parties or even systemically throughout
contract law.
IV. CONTEXT AS DELEGITIMATION-CHANGING THE RULES OF THE
GAME FOR BARGAINING ADVANTAGE
Claims that contextual differences matter in terms of contract
outcome implicitly state a normative claim that contract law should
respond to those differences. Under this normative claim, contract
law cannot function properly unless it employs HCS in dispute
resolution. If courts do not redress contextual differences, the entire
regime of contract law that is justified on principles of private
Professor Lisa Bernstein reports the comment of a cotton industry arbitrator
preferring LCS precisely because HCS expands the possible inquiry too much:
"'We look to the contract and then to the trade rules; this is all we have to
base ... [our decision] on. Other things like custom and the background [of the
deal] are infinitely variable so we don't look to them.'" Lisa Bernstein, Private
Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules,
Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1724, 1737 (2001); accord Ben-
Shahar, supra note 18, at 813-14.
95. See Scott, supra note 4, at 848 ("The contract theory literature suggests
that the activist role courts traditionally have been asked to assume in
specifying default rules ex ante and/or adjusting contractual risks ex post may
be far less useful in a complex, heterogeneous economy.").
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autonomy, consent, and equality of opportunity loses legitimacy. In
that sense, it represents a delegitimation of classical contract law.
The systemic changes to bargaining power that result from
delegitimation of specific contract doctrines or contract law
generally occur on two levels: the level of specific classes of
contracting parties, and the systemic level that affects contracting
generally across all classes of contracting parties.
A. Delegitimation To Correct Class Specific Bargaining Power
Disparities
HCS establish specific contextual categories that justify post
hoc judicial intervention to "correct" perceived bargaining power
disparities. Thus, employees, consumers, franchisees, musicians,
and other apparently "weak" classes lack (or their opponents
possess) some quality that prevents the apparently weaker party
from participating fully in contract and from effecting preferred
outcomes in the bargaining process. These categorical bargaining
power disparities are used to justify normative claims that the state
should intervene to adjust contract terms, interpretation, or
enforcement in order to correct the negative impact of the inequality
of bargaining power."
For example, parties approaching American contract law from
different linguistic or cultural backgrounds are disadvantaged by
contract law itself and may argue that American contract law should
either change or adjust to compensate for these disparities. As one
commentator argued in discussing the context of Chinese firms
contracting with American companies,
[Fior U.S. contract law principles to be legitimate in the global
96. Admittedly, there are other theories for justifying the modern American
contract regime that do not depend upon classical notions of private autonomy,
liberal ideals of equality, and public neutrality toward private ordering.
Communitarian ideals, for instance, would fully justify differential treatment of
classes of contracting parties solely because preferencing members of those
classes best accords with social policy or community morality. See, e.g., Philip
Selznick, The Jurisprudence of Communitarian Liberalism, in
COMMUNITARIANISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY 19, 20-21 (Paul Van Seters ed., 2006)
(attempting to synthesize communitarianism and liberalism in describing
communitarianism as an emphasis on both the interests of the individual and
the community within which the individual is situated rather than looking
"only to baseline standards of equality and justice"); cf PLATO, CRITO, reprinted
in FOuR TEXTS ON SOCRATES 99, 112-14 (Thomas G. West & Grace Starry West
trans., rev. ed. 1998) (relating Socrates' argument that he could not justly flee
execution in Athens because it had been the laws of Athens that created and
shaped his identity). Nonetheless, it is hardly debatable that modem contract
law is generally justified on the classically liberal grounds described above.
97. See W. DAVID SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES: THE LATE 20TH-CENTURY
REFORMATION OF CONTRACT LAW 23 (1996) (arguing that inequalities of
bargaining power justify state intervention into private contracts).
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business community, they need to take into consideration the
cultural differences of the parties from other countries....
U.S. contract law is unfair to people with different cultural
values, because this can perpetuate the existing inequities
between U.S. companies and companies from other countries
with different cultures.98
Likewise, Professor Rachel Arnow-Richman's comprehensive
analysis of "cubewrap" employment contracts strongly suggests that
not only do the vast majority of employees suffer from gross
disparities of bargaining power but also that courts should directly
police particularly exploitative bargaining power abuses by
employers." Similar cases for high-context treatments of other
categories of apparently weak contracting parties can be made on
the basis of race,' 0 gender,'0 nursing home status,102 retirement
status, 0 3  borrower status,10 4  and any other status-based
98. Chunlin Leonhard, Beyond the Four Corners of a Written Contract: A
Global Challenge to U.S. Contract Law, 21 PACE INT'L L. REV. 1, 15-32 (2009)
(emphasis added) (arguing against application of parol evidence rule to non-U.S.
contracting parties); accord Florestal, supra note 23, at 8 (arguing that judicial
determination of meaning of contract term "sandwich" to exclude burritos
masked unconscious bias that failed to account for race, class, and culture in
interpreting contract).
99. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 22, at 963-67; see also Rachel Arnow-
Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age: A Reconsideration of
the Role of Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 80 OR. L.
REV. 1163, 1197-1211 (2001); Rachel Arnow-Richman, Noncompetes, Human
Capital, and Contract Formation: What Employment Law Can Learn From
Family Law, 10 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REV. 155, 157-60 (2003).
100. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in
Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARv. L. REV. 817, 827-41 (1991) [hereinafter
Ayres, Fair Driving]; Ian Ayres, Further Evidence of Discrimination in New Car
Negotiations and Estimates of Its Cause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 109, 110 (1995); see
also Amy H. Kastely, Out of the Whiteness: On Raced Codes and White Race
Consciousness in Some Tort, Criminal, and Contract Law, 63 U. CIN. L. REV.
269, 304-10 (1994) (arguing that objective theories of contract incorporate racial
narratives that maintain and promote white race consciousness).
101. See, e.g., Ayres, Fair Driving, supra note 100, at 818-20, 827-41.
102. See, e.g., Lisa Tripp, A Senior Moment: The Executive Branch Solution
to the Problem of Binding Arbitration Agreements in Nursing Home Admission
Contracts, 31 CAMPBELL L. REV. 157, 181-86 (2009).
103. See, e.g., Kaplan et al., supra note 22, at 291-95 (noting that retiree
health coverage is particularly vulnerable); Elizabeth C. Borer, Note,
Modernizing Medicare: Protecting America's Most Vulnerable Patients from
Predatory Health Care Marketing Through Accessible Legal Remedies, 92 MINN.
L. REV. 1165, 1165-70 (2008) (emphasizing the vulnerability of the elderly and
the need for legal protection against abusive contracting).
104. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 8-11, 33-56 (2008) (identifying and assessing borrower
irrationalities, biases, and cognitive distortions across multiple classes of credit
transactions that generate bargaining weaknesses in buyers); see also Karen E.
Francis, Note, Rollover, Rollover: A Behavioral Law and Economics Analysis of
the Payday-Loan Industry, 88 TEx. L. REV. 611, 611-15 (2010) (arguing in favor
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classification that is potentially outcome-influencing in contract.
The Ninth Circuit arbitration unconscionability cases discussed
above demonstrate a tendency by the court to single out specific
classes for protection from what the court deems exploitative
arbitration agreements. The court most clearly accorded consumers
the status of "weak" contracting parties, both in the types of
challenges it was willing to consider and its treatment of consumers
appearing before it.o' While references to consumers' lack of
meaningful alternatives are ubiquitous, the former type of
preferential treatment is potentially more insidious and important.
In terms of case selection, only two of the thirty-eight cases
evaluated involved business-to-business contracts, 06  and one
involved a venture-capital investment agreement. 1o The remaining
cases involved consumers,"o" franchisees,'09 or employees.1o
In the consumer context, with only one absurd exception,"' the
court held the arbitration term was unconscionable or remanded for
further findings on unconscionability.112 The court's explicit use of
of using behavioral law and economics to identify payday-loan industry
borrower classes at high risk of default).
105. The court repeatedly held that consumers lacked bargaining power and
meaningful alternatives. See Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 854-
55 (9th Cir. 2009); Janda v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 267 Fed. App'x 727, 728 (9th
Cir. 2008); Lowden v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 512 F.3d 1213, 1220 (9th Cir. 2008);
Douglas v. U.S. Dist. Court, 495 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir, 2007); Ford v.
Verisign, Inc., 252 Fed. App'x 781, 783 (9th Cir. 2007); Laster v. T-Mobile USA,
Inc., 252 Fed. App'x 777, 779-80 (9th Cir. 2007); Shroyer v. New Cingular
Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 981-86 (9th Cir. 2007); Ting v. AT&T, 319
F.3d 1126, 1148-52 (9th Cir. 2003).
106. Kam-Ko Bio-Pharm Trading Co. v. Mayne Pharma (USA) Inc., 560 F.3d
935, 938 (9th Cir. 2009); Net Global Mktg., Inc. v. Dialtone, Inc., 271 Fed. App'x
598, 599 (9th Cir. 2007).
107. Dziubla v. Cargill, Inc., 214 Fed. App'x 658, 659 (9th Cir. 2006).
108. See supra notes 55-56, 59 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. Notably, the court treated
both of the franchisees challenging arbitration clauses as consumers. See
Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1282-84 (9th Cir. 2006); Ticknor
v. Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931, 939-41 (9th Cir. 2001).
110. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
111. In re Detwiler, 305 Fed. App'x 353, 356 (9th Cir. 2008). In that case,
the consumer challenged as unconscionable a clause specifying the consumer's
home state of Florida rather than the producer's home state of Washington as
the arbitral forum. Id.
112. See Chalk v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 560 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2009); Laster
v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009); Oestreicher v. Alienware
Corp., 322 Fed. App'x 489 (9th Cir. 2009); Davis v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 299
Fed. App'x 662 (9th Cir. 2008); Hoffman v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 546 F.3d 1078
(9th Cir. 2008); Janda v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 267 Fed. App'x 727 (9th Cir. 2008);
Lowden v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 512 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2008); Douglas v. U.S.
Dist. Court, 495 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2007); Ford v. Verisign, Inc., 252 Fed. App'x
781 (9th Cir. 2007); Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 252 Fed. App'x 777 (9th Cir.
2007); Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976 (9th Cir.
2007); Tamayo v. Brainstorm USA, 154 Fed. App'x 564 (9th Cir. 2005); Ting v.
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context in these cases varied widely. In many instances, the court
held the arbitration clause unconscionable using a low-context
strategy such as a per se rule against arbitration clauses that acted
as class-action waivers in consumer contracts." In others, the court
engaged in a high-context evaluation of the case before invalidating
the clause."' Regardless of the degree of explicit contextual inquiry,
however, the paucity of opinions addressing unconscionability
challenges between commercial entities suggests that the court may
have used contextual factors such as a belief in the inherent
weakness of consumers to favor that status group in post hoc
policing of contractual fairness.
On its face, that courts might be more sympathetic to
consumers than to firms in determining whether to hear
unconscionability-based appeals is not surprising. But importantly,
nothing in the abstract legal standard for unconscionability compels
such a lopsided result. In fact, unconscionability standards
explicitly are open to claims by commercial entities as well as
traditionally weak classes." 5 And it is also clear that business
entities and their owners-particularly small businesses-are
susceptible to exactly the gross disparities of bargaining power that
motivate courts to find unconscionability in consumer contracts."6
Given this reality, it seems highly unlikely that contracts between
business firms would account for less than eight percent of
arbitration clause unconscionability opinions by the court if the legal
standards were applied in the abstract. Such disproportionality at
least raises the possibility that background contextual factors
operate to prevent the courts from examining, or even the parties
themselves from bringing, some types of unconscionability-based
claims. "'
AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003).
113. See, e.g., Lowden, 512 F.3d at 1218-19; Tamayo, 154 Fed. App'x at 566.
114. See, e.g., Ting, 319 F.3d at 1130-34, 1148-52.
115. See Net Global Mktg., Inc. v. Dialtone, Inc., 217 Fed. App'x 598, 600-02
(9th Cir. 2007) (holding an arbitration agreement between business firms
unconscionable); see also Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931, 941
(9th Cir. 2001) (holding Montana unconscionability law applicable to
"supposedly sophisticated business owners").
116. See Blake D. Morant, The Quest for Bargains in an Age of Contractual
Formalism: Strategic Initiatives for Small Businesses, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING
Bus. L. 233, 250-67 (2003).
117. It is possible that this disparity arises because commercial parties are
more capable than consumers of signaling preferences for LCS. Contracting
firms may, for instance, signal LCS preferences by lawyering up their deal or
contracting within highly formalized industries such as the grain and feed
markets described by Professor Bernstein. See Bernstein, supra note 4, at
1771-82. I anticipate that this signaling phenomenon as it relates to the
quality of the parties' assent and their preference for LCS will be the subject of
a future article.
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B. Delegitimation as Systemic Bargaining Power
HCS also systemically shift bargaining power from repeat
players to sporadic contractors.118  Specifically, LCS that dominate
the classical and modem contract regimes described by Professor
Danielle Kie Hart will strengthen the bargaining power of repeat
players who act within that system over time."9 LCS, such as a
strict four-corners approach to parol evidence or the peppercorn
theory of consideration, provide bargaining power advantages to
repeat players by limiting the array of factors they must control in
transactions with nonrepeat players. Repeat players gain
bargaining power advantages over time in a low-context regime by
simply having a better grasp and control of the playing field.
Consider the contract formation arrangements that Hart
describes as inevitably coercive, particularly with respect to
adhesion contracts.120  Repeat players benefit from contract
doctrines that treat adhesive standard form contracts as the
equivalent of dickered agreements for purposes of contract
formation.12' The repeat player controls the initial presentation of
contract terms and establishes routines and bureaucracies that
inhibit the effectiveness of sporadic contractors' attempts to bargain
away from the initial terms.'22  After contracting, the sporadic
118. Professor Hillman notes a similar phenomenon with respect to the
advantages of repeat players in rules-based systems as compared to standards-
based systems. See HILLMAN, supra note 14, at 136 ("Contextualists assert that
a rule-based legal framework ... favors parties repeatedly involved with the
legal system, generally large companies that can most easily adapt to the
rules."). But the systemic shift of bargaining power is not limited to the rules
versus standards question and extends to any high-context dispute resolution
system.
119. Professor Hart observes that modern contract doctrine purports to limit
the unfairness of classical contract law primarily through interpretive doctrines
and expanded defenses. See Hart, supra note 7, at 177-82. Such differences
between modern and classical contract law obfuscate the similarities in contract
formation that coercively presume the validity of purported contracts created by
adherence to classical theories of contract formation. See id. at 217 ("The easier
it is to form a contract ... the easier it is for the coercing party to obtain the
presumption of contract validity.").
120. See id. at 217-18 (citing contracts for consumer credit products such as
payday loans, fee harvester cards, refund anticipation loans, generic credit
cards, and subprime mortgages); see also Freidrich Kessler, Contracts of
Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629,
630-32 (1943) (noting the existence of coercive agreements in the form of
standardized contacts and arguing that courts should not be hostile to
legislation designed to resolve bargaining power disparities in adhesion
contracts).
121. Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The
Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583,
1585-86 (1998). Sporadic contractors as a class may also receive a net benefit
even from adhesive standard form contracts, compared to the alternatives. See
id. at 1594-95.
122. See id. at 1587-93.
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contractor will necessarily incur significant costs in attempting to
escape from its terms. 2  And when courts adopt LCS, the repeat
player has already metaphorically placed all of its pieces in
controlling positions, leaving the nonrepeat player with few or no
meaningful options for resisting the outcome preferred by the repeat
player. 124
Successful claims that contract law should adopt HCS for
dispute resolution will shift bargaining power away from repeat
players by increasing the number of potential outcome-
determinative or outcome-influencing factors that are relevant to
formation, interpretation, and enforcement of contracts. HCS inject
a greater number of salient factors into the process of evaluating
and enforcing contracts. While LCS create incentives for repeat
players to maximize their bargaining power by controlling the key
determinative issues-objective indicia of assent, consideration, and
the contract terms-HCS introduce factors that are beyond the
control of the repeat player. Many such factors will, in fact, be
unknowable to either party at the moment of contract. At the
extreme, a high-context strategy may introduce so many salient or
potentially salient factors into the judicial analysis that the result is
just increased unpredictability or even chaos.12 5
Incorporation of HCS would thus seem to increase the systemic
bargaining power of the classes of nonrepeat players that are able to
make their contextual arguments salient to judicial analysis. In
Judge Frank's world, then, musicians may have greater ability to
achieve preferred outcomes in the bargaining process because
publishing companies would be barred from demanding exploitative
terms.2 6 In the arbitration context, the Ninth Circuit has engaged
in a high-context march against what it considers to be exploitative
or abusive arbitration contracts with consumers, employees, and
franchisees.'"' In both situations, the HCS employed in
unconscionability and other analyses appear to improve the
bargaining power of the nonrepeat players.
The problem is that bargaining power is dynamic, and the
normal and likely inevitable reaction to the development of any
position of power is the development of an opposing source of
power. Repeat players-usually business firms-will always have
123. See Hart, supra note 7, at 217-18 (noting the difficulty for a
nondrafting party to rebut the presumption of contract validity after signing the
contract).
124. Except, of course, the obvious solution of simply walking away from a
bad deal.
125. See supra notes 32-35, 95 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
127. See supra Part III.
128. Cf Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081-82 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes,
J., dissenting) (recognizing the development of opposing power loci in the
capital versus labor relationship).
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incentives to use their resources to stack the deck in their favor
until it is no longer profitable to continue to engage in business. As
with the Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., which reduced its business
and supply of credit and altered its contract terms to some extent
following Williams,121 judicial attempts at protection of particular
members of apparently disadvantaged classes have always carried
the threat of unintended and potentially disastrous consequences for
other members of the protected classes. 30
Likewise, the ability of repeat players to make incremental
adjustments to their contracting practices in response to specific
decisions invalidating specific contract terms is well documented.' 3 1
This phenomenon can be seen in the arbitration field as producers,
employers, and franchisors adjust the terms of their arbitration
clauses to attempt to satisfy holdings invalidating their clauses by
providing opt-out opportunities, lengthy notice and cooling-off
periods, alterations in the mutuality of claims subject to arbitration,
and so on. Courts, in effect, play catch-up as each change is
introduced into arbitration agreements systematically and works its
way through the judicial system. 132
A recent Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court arbitration case-
Jackson v. Rent-A-Center West, Inc. 133--deals with exactly this type
of reaction by repeat players to the HCS employed by courts against
arbitration clauses. In Jackson, the Rent-A-Center employment
contract attempted to eliminate judicial attacks on arbitration
clauses by giving the "Arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local
court or agency, . . . exclusive authority to resolve any dispute
relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability or
formation of [the] Agreement including, but not limited to any claim
that all or any part of [the] Agreement is void or voidable."134
Compared to prior incremental changes in arbitration contracts, the
129. See Colby, supra note 90, at 658.
130. See Leff, supra note 43, at 556-57.
131. See, e.g., Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic
Theory of How Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation
Between Businesses and Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REV. 857, 884-97 (2006)
(noting the perverse impacts on the ability of firms and consumers to negotiate
flexibly around standard form terms as a result of state intervention); see also
Colby, supra note 90, at 650-60.
132. Professor Scott addresses the difficulty of crafting default rules to
control strategic or opportunistic behavior:
While the goal is laudatory, implementation may be counterproductive
as it is difficult to fashion any default rule that outlines an elaborate
contingent set of rights and duties for both parties. Where the default
rules are complex, it is difficult to determine who is in breach and who
is not.
Robert Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19
J. LEGAL STUD. 597, 611 (1990).
133. 581 F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 2009), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
134. Id. at 914 (emphasis added).
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Jackson contract is a nuclear bomb that would remove the high-
context unconscionability determination from courts altogether and
place it in the hands of an arbitrator.'
While delegitimation of classical contract law (and the resulting
bargaining power contests as repeat players adjust their contracting
practices to new rules or standards) is likely a primary driver of the
evolution of common law doctrine over time, it is a poor mechanism
for enacting significant social policies and achieving meaningful
justice in contract. When successful delegitimation increases the
number of potentially salient contextual factors for resolving
contract disputes, HCS also increase the potential bases on which
the loser may view the court's decision as biased, illogical, and not
worthy of respect. Situations in which repeat players have opted out
of judicial contract resolution altogether, such as the Rent-A-Center
arbitration clause in Jackson or the private arbitration systems of
the National Grain and Feed Association and diamond merchants
observed by Professor Lisa Bernstein,136 may represent reactions by
repeat players against the HCS of the judicial contract dispute
resolution system.
In light of these problems, courts should be highly resistant to
delegitimating arguments favoring HCS. First, courts are not really
competent to assess the types of arguments and evidence that must
be proved to justify many types of delegitimating claims. Even in
the case of consumer arbitration contracts, it remains an open
question whether consumers actually are made worse off by having
to make their claims in an arbitral rather than a judicial forum.3 7
135. The ultimate validity of such agreements is unclear even after the
Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit opinion and upheld the
enforceability of the Jackson arbitration agreement. Writing for the majority,
Justice Scalia held that Jackson had only challenged the arbitration contract as
a whole, rather than the specific provisions delegating to the arbitrator
authority to determine the enforceability of the agreement. See Rent-A-Ctr. W.,
130 S. Ct. at 2777-78. Under the reasoning of two prior Supreme Court cases
the Court held that because Jackson only challenged the validity of the
arbitration agreement as a whole, those challenges were to be determined by
the arbitrator, not the courts. See id. at 2778-80. Notably, Justice Scalia's
opinion expressly left open the possibility that had Jackson challenged the
delegation provision itself as unconscionable, that challenge would have been
properly determined by the court. See id. at 2779. Justice Scalia also opined in
dicta that even a properly framed challenge to the delegation provision would
have been unlikely to succeed. See id. at 2780.
136. See Bernstein, supra note 4, at 1775-77 (describing NGFA arbitration
system as highly formalistic, acontextual, and generally unfavorable to
relatively high-context U.C.C. rules that would otherwise apply to grain
contracts); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal
Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 124-30
(1992) (describing private dispute resolution mechanism of diamond industry).
137. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration
Agreements-With Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration
Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 254-62 (2006) (noting the likely cost savings to
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Similarly, class-action waivers in the consumer context likewise are
not immediately abhorrent given that many consumer class actions
result in consumers receiving de minimis settlements such as
coupons they do not value for additional products they do not
want. '3 8 These are issues of social policy that courts are generally
not equipped to handle.
Second, the more courts come to be seen as sources of systemic
bargaining power advantages, the more they will become a
battlefield for parties seeking those advantages. As courts
incorporate more HCS into specific contract disputes, they weaken
the ability to reject high-context arguments in other cases.
Widespread or universal incorporation of HCS risks destroying
many of the efficiency- and wealth-maximizing benefits of contract
law. '39  The LCS approach to modern contract law is a relatively
efficient dispute resolution mechanism that is theoretically
accessible to anyone who wants to contract. It may be that
practically some parties cannot (or will not) meaningfully take
advantage of that access. But incorporating HCS, at the extreme,
means that contract law becomes accessible to no one and loses the
efficiency benefits it currently enjoys. Contextualization in this
sense risks becoming a metarule for contract analysis that begins
with the presumption that extralegal contextual factors are salient
to that analysis. In that event, courts should adopt HCS even when
such strategies would produce results identical or even inferior to
those following from LCS.
While the delegitimative thesis does not provide a meaningful
justification for widespread HCS in the judicial context, it does
justify political action in the legislative and regulatory context.
Ultimately, the delegitimative thesis is an argument that some
transactions and contexts are unsuited for private ordering. Indeed,
the residual nature of contract law is already defined by legislative
consumers generated by arbitration and the impossibility of empirical analysis
of the actual amount of savings passed on to consumers as a result of
arbitration); see also Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial
Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DIsP. RESOL. 89, 90-93
(recognizing the price-lowering effect of arbitration clauses).
138. See Adam S. Zimmerman, Funding Irrationality, 59 DuKE L.J. 1105,
1127-31, 1132-55 (2010) (describing critiques of consumer class-action
settlements and assessing cognitive distortions affecting decision maker choices
in determining whether to accept proposed settlements); see also In re Cuisinart
Food Processor Antitrust Litig., Nos. H 81-196, H 81-610, H 81-444, H 81-194,
H 81-170, H 81-193, H 81-71, H 195, 1983 WL 153, at *7-8 (D. Conn. Oct. 24,
1983) (approving coupon settlement requiring additional purchase of
defendant's products); West v. Carfax, Inc., No. 2008-T-0045, 2009 WL 5064143,
at *4-5 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 24, 2009) (remanding for determination of whether
proposed coupon settlement had actual value to members of plaintiffs' class); cf
28 U.S.C. §§ 1712-1715 (2006).
139. See Macaulay, supra note 2, at 79 (noting the high cost and low
predictability associated with HCS).
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interventions that remove particular transaction types from
regulation through private contract altogether. For example,
Congress has provided legislative protections for employment
contracts for seamen since 1790.140 As the Fifth Circuit observed,
seamen need such legislative protection because of their lack of
bargaining power in dealing with shipowners: "A seaman isolated on
a ship on the high seas is often vulnerable to the exploitation of his
employer. Moreover, there exists a great inequality in bargaining
position between large shipowners and unsophisticated seamen.
Shipowners generally control the availability and terms of
employment.,,141 Similarly, contracts between organized labor and
management have been regulated by statute since 1935, expressly
because of Congressional determinations that employees lack
bargaining power in dealing with employers. 4 2 And with respect to
arbitration clauses, the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009,
among other things, would ban the use of binding arbitration
clauses in consumer and employment contracts.143
In these situations, contextual arguments support rhetoric that
contract law "failed" in regulating those relationships. That
delegitimation of contract law justified a political response to
remove those relations from regulation by contract and establish an
alternative regime to control the terms and enforcement of the
transaction. The ultimate result shifted bargaining power from one
class of parties to another, but unlike judicial actions, this shift is
relatively transparent and susceptible to additional contests to
expand, limit, or eliminate its scope as the factions continue to lobby
for greater contracting strength.
Such legislative responses to the use of HCS to delegitimate
regulation of particular transaction types or classes of parties within
contract law are preferable to attempts to create new doctrines
within contract law because they preserve the availability of a low-
context contract regime for parties who truly benefit from that
regime.'" There are some classes of parties that prefer LCS for
contract resolution. As with the National Grain and Feed
Association's decision to opt out entirely of the relatively high-
context U.C.C. regime,14' LCS may provide greater benefits for
sophisticated commercial entities than could be obtained from high-
140. See Rogers v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, 547 F.3d 1148, 1151-52
(9th Cir. 2008) (discussing the history of Congressional protections for wages
and employment contracts of seafaring employees, currently codified at 46
U.S.C. § 10313).
141. See Castillo v. Spiliada Mar. Corp., 937 F.2d 240, 243 (5th Cir. 1991).
142. See Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
143. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. §§ 3-4 (2009);
S. 931, 111th Cong. §§ 3-4 (2009).
144. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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context regimes.14 ' As discussed above, however, delegitimative uses
of HCS will tend to infect all of contract law, thereby reducing the
efficiency and utility of contract for those parties who actually do
engage in the classical contract model of a dickered exchange
between parties of relatively equal bargaining power. If the
delegitimative argument shifts from judicial application of contract
law to the political arena, legislative responses will avoid the
problem of normatively justifying new contract rules that benefit
only particular classes of contracting parties.
However, it is also unrealistic to expect much from legislative
reactions to context. While legislatures are better constituted than
courts for responding to political arguments, they are also more
subject to capture and other public choice problems.'4 ' And while
legislative responses are not subject to the same normative
limitations as courts, this freedom of action is not unlimited.
Ultimately, the distinction between HCS that are the domain of
courts and those that belong to the legislatures is imperfect and
constantly shifting.
The political reaction to HCS is thus only a partial solution to
the problem of context in contract law. As noted, context is
constitutive of contract law, and it is impossible for courts to avoid
arguments that they should acknowledge and respond to contextual
factors that determine or influence the outcome of contract
negotiation, formation, and dispute resolution. Context, as with all
types of bargaining power, is often deceptive and hidden. Courts in
many cases do not even realize when they have approached
individual cases with assumptions based on implicit background
factors. Inevitably, context will creep into every judicial analysis of
contract law.
CONCLUSION
Contextualist claims in contract are inevitable. I am not
directly concerned here with the correct scope of contextual inquiry
or the proper selection of contextual factors to be addressed by
contract law.
Instead, this Article is about the legitimative and delegitimative
justifications for moving along a continuum from modern contract
law methods and interpretational principles employing LCS toward
a more expansively standards- and context-based HCS regime.
Arguments that aim to move contract law in either direction along
this continuum are attempts to adjust the rules of the playing field
146. Cf Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of
Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 543-49 (2003) (arguing in favor of a pluralistic
theory of contract in which contract law is best suited primarily for contracts
between business firms while alternative protective rules govern business to
individual, individual-to-individual, and individual-to-business contracts).
147. See HILLMAN, supra note 14, at 136.
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on which the parties make, perform, and enforce their contracts.
Although a true assessment of the legitimative thesis would require
an empirical analysis beyond the scope of this Article, anecdotal
evidence suggests that courts really are not that good at processing
large amounts of raw, diverse, and subjective contextual information
that often will not even be recognized by the parties at the time of
contracting. Moreover, in a highly heterogeneous, rapidly
diversifying (or even balkanizing) culture, the challenges of
identifying and responding to context will only grow more extreme
with time. Context is expensive, in terms of time, attention,
resources, and juristic credibility.
But some shifts toward HCS may be justifiable under the
delegitimative thesis. Importantly, such delegitimative arguments
must be understood as attempts to improve the bargaining power of
one of the parties to the dispute. This bargaining power contest
occurs at the level of specific classes of contracting parties, such as
employer-employee, producer-customer, and franchisor-franchisee,
and attempts to shift power from the stronger to the weaker party
by recognizing that weakness and adopting corrective doctrines to
respond to it.
The contest also occurs on a systemic level as the incorporation
of an ever-greater number of contextual factors into contract law
works to the disadvantage of repeat players who have previously
largely controlled the legally salient contextual factors but now must
contend with a larger scope of uncontrollable and unpredictable
factors. This process, however, is essentially a political struggle
rather than a legal issue. In the judicial context, this strategy likely
will not be successful, but it is potentially coherent at the political
level of legislation and regulation.
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